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ABSTRACT 
 
With the growing popularity of "Internet of Things" (IoT), 
devices in our households and offices are becoming configurable 
to be information sharing “smart” devices and be controlled via 
network connections. The growth of collection, handling and 
distribution of data generated by IoT devices presents ethical and 
privacy issues. Users have no control over what information to 
keep or reveal, interpretation of data collected, data ownership 
and who can access specific information generated by the IoT 
devices owned by them. More and more IoT users are seeking 
ways to control access to data generated. The main aim of this 
paper is to describe how to solve data ethical/privacy issues 
related to IoT using a fine-grained access-control framework on 
Igor, a centralized home and office automation solution to solve 
the data sharing and access issues. Data collected from IoT 
devices are stored in a centralized location controlled by the data 
owner and all access is controlled and granted through Igor. A 
Capability-Based Access Control Model (CapBAC) solution has 
been adapted for this project. The implementation, expert 
evaluation and performance measurement results demonstrate that 
this is a promising solution for securing access to data generated 
by IoT devices. 
 
Keywords  
Internet of Things, ethical and privacy issues, IoT, authorization, 
access control, framework 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The term "Internet of Things" (IoT) [1] was first expressed 
by Kevin Ashton in 1999. Since then, IoT has become more and 
more mainstream. In 2013, Ashton insisted on the realization that 
IoT is here now; it is not the future but the present [1]. Cisco 
IBSG predicts there will be 50 billion devices connected to the 
Internet by 2020 [2]. With the growing popularity of IoT, more 
and more of the devices in our households and offices are 
configurable to be information sharing “smart” devices, controlled 
via network connections.  
IoT devices’ data collection, handling and distribution are 
also growing drastically. With that, users in general are facing 
ethical and privacy issues. This raises higher concerns as 
corporations start to monetize the data collected. Mason [3] 
categorized these ethical issues as PAPA: a) Privacy: What 
information about one's self or one's associations must a person 
reveal to others, under what conditions and with what 
safeguards? What things can people keep to themselves and not 
be forced to reveal to others? b) Accuracy: Who is responsible for 
the authenticity, fidelity and accuracy of information? c) 
Property: Who owns information? What are the just and fair 
prices for its exchange? d) Accessibility: What information does a 
person or an organization have a right or a privilege to obtain, 
under what conditions and with what safeguards?  
Caron et. al. [4] performed an analysis on how IoT impacts on 
individual privacy and concluded that the IoT key themes related 
to the ethical issues highlighted by Mason [3] are: unauthorized 
surveillance, uncontrolled data generation and use, inadequate 
authentication, and information security risk. Privacy and security 
are also the main topics of concern during a public consultation 
involving general users, associations, academic groups, civil 
societies and industry players conducted by the European 
Commission in 2012 [5]. 
Besides privacy, there is also a need to protect data access at 
different levels of detail. Figure 1 shows an example where 
Pauline is going away on holiday for 2 weeks. Her 17-year-old 
nephew, Jack is coming over to stay at Pauline’s house while she 
is away. Pauline would like to give Jack access to the main door 
of the house and the guest room, but not her study where she has 
confidential documents. The house is equipped with smart door 
locks, however, of different makes and models. Each lock uses a 
different remote control, and user console, and has a different data 
storage location. There is no central control where Pauline can 
specify access for Jack to only certain locks and data collected 
from these smarts locks to be stored in one location only 
accessible to Pauline. 
While Pauline is away, she would like to know when Jack is 
at home without knowing the details of his activities or his exact 
location in the house (for Jack’s privacy). Pauline also wants to 
know if there are more visitors in the house besides Jack. For 
Jack’s safety, she wants to be triggered if there are unknown 
people in the house at night (between 23:00-7:00). Pauline would 
like access to all this information without sharing it with other 
parties like corporate companies. 
Other external parties, for example, Steven, the landlord of 
the house where Pauline is the main tenant, only need to know if 
there is someone in the house, so that he can come over to service 
the heating system. He does not need to know who is at home 
because he does not need that information to complete his task. 
However, there is no solution currently to trigger Steven when the 
number of occupants is more than 0, between working hours 9:00 
to 17:00. After 2 weeks, Jack returns to his parents. Pauline needs 
to remove all his accesses and information generated during his 
stay as they are not needed anymore, and to protect Jack’s 
privacy. 
 
Figure 1 – Example of challenges in providing fine-grained 
access control 
The problem statement this paper addresses is: “The growth of 
collection, handling and distribution of data generated by IoT 
devices has presented ethical and privacy issues. Users have no 
control over what information to keep or reveal, interpretation of 
data collected, data ownership and who can access specific 
information generated by the IoT devices owned by them.” 
Our aim is to solve data ethical/privacy issues related to IoT 
as defined by Mason’s PAPA model and as explained in the 
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example above. From the use case, six requirements of the access 
control mechanism are formulated: 
• R1 – New users or devices can be easily added  
• R2 – Access control can be delegated from the owner to others 
• R3 – Access control can be revoked by the owners  
• R4 - Access control of data should be fine-grained 
• R5 – Access control should be easily managed and modified 
for/by normal users  
• R6 - Access control solution should not add heavy processing 
requirement as IoT devices have low processing power 
 
Mason’s 
ethical issues 
(PAPA) 
How to solve that? Requireme
nts  
Privacy Through proper access control 
mechanism, sensitive data is 
concealed / hidden from public 
R1, R2, R3, 
R4 
Accuracy Keeps the data only accessible to 
the owners, the data owner can 
verify on the accuracy of the 
information presented and is able to 
choose whether to share it with 
others or not 
R2, R3, R4, 
R5 
Property Data is stored in a storage area 
controlled by the rightful owner. 
Thus, no dispute on data ownership 
R1, R2, R3 
Accessibility The data owner decides who can 
access what data 
R1, R2, R3, 
R4, R5 
Table 1 – Mapping of Mason’s four ethical issues related to 
information generated by IoT with proposed solutions and project 
requirements 
Table 1 shows a summary of the mapping of Mason’s four 
ethical issues related to information generated by IoT devices with 
our proposed solution through Igor and project requirements. R6 
is a non-functional requirement requiring the solution to be able 
to be run on light weight IoT devices with acceptable 
performance.  
The solution is to keep data generated by IoT devices in a 
storage location controlled by the data owners, where they are 
empowered to decide who can see or access the data, even to a 
fine-grained level. 
1.1 This Paper’s Contribution 
We designed an access control framework on top of Igor, a 
unified access solution to the IoT [6] by focusing on authorization 
of different agents accessing, interacting, performing tasks and 
sharing information with each other. Authentication of agents, 
though important, was not in scope and should be addressed in 
future work. The solution covers lightweight IoT devices such as 
mobile phones, in household and office appliances. Industrial IoT 
which can continuously generate huge amount of data and 
requires high capacity storage space is out of scope. 
The following sections of this paper discuss related work that 
has been carried out previously on access control approaches for 
IoT, the interaction design, system design, implementation of our 
approach, evaluation of the design implementation, conclusion 
and future work.  
2. RELATED WORK 
 
This paper extends the work done by Jansen & Pemberton [6] 
on Igor. Igor, is named after a Discworld [7] character, a butler 
who knows and controls everything that goes on in the household, 
and makes sure everything runs smoothly and perform tasks 
without passing judgements and maintaining complete discretion. 
There are also other Igors working together in the environment.  
Domoticz [8] is a light weight home automation system 
similar to Igor. It allows users to monitor and configure IoT 
devices and notifications or alerts can be sent to any mobile 
device. Domoticz uses its own embedded web server written in 
C++. On top of that, users can write simple Blockly [9] or LUA 
[10] scripts right in the graphical user interface (GUI) provided. 
Domoticz uses an SQL Lite [11] database and access to the 
database is controlled at database level. For Domoticz, access is 
granted to users by device and there is no fine-grained data access 
control defined. 
Fahrny and Park [12] designed authentication and binding 
multiple devices where the first device (of a higher security 
profile) may vouch for the authenticity of a second device with a 
lower security profile. This allows the second device to access the 
content from a content provider. The vouching process involves 
the overlaying of a digital signature of the first device on a 
registration request that has been signed and transmitted by the 
second device.  
Ouaddah et. al. [13] performed extensive qualitative analysis 
on the various security access models for the IoT devices. They 
highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each access control 
solution proposed by others that are most relevant, such as RBAC 
(Role-Based Access Control) by Sandhu, et. al. [14], ABAC 
(Attribute-Based Access Control) by Yuan and Tong [15], UCON 
(Usage Control Model) by Zhang, et. al. [16], CapBAC 
(Capability-Based Access Control Model) by Gong [17] and 
OrBAC (Organizational-Based Access Control Model) by Kalam, 
et. al. [18]. Ouaddah et. al. [13]  found that quantitative 
evaluation on most of the proposed access control models from 
the available literature is not possible yet because they have not 
been developed in practice. Nevertheless, from their analysis, it is 
clear that CapBAC has more advantages than the other solutions 
as it is one of the oldest and is a proven access control model [19-
21] .  
In 2017, Hossain, Hasan and Skjellum [22] performed a meta 
study of the challenges, approaches and open problems with the 
security of IoT. They concluded that it is hard to find a solution 
that accommodates a heterogeneous mix of diverse IoT devices. 
They are positive about CapBAC access control mechanism, as it 
is suitable for both the human-to-things and things-to-things 
communications.  
The concept of capability-based access control started with 
the paper presented by Dennis and Van Horn [19] in 1966 to 
manage computer hardware computation activities in multi-
programmed computer systems. They introduced capability as 
token or key that defined permissions to processors to access 
computational objects. From then onwards, many more books and 
papers have been written about capability-based access control to 
further refine the concept and to address its weaknesses. In 1988, 
Levy [20] further explained the concept of capability-based 
computer systems and its benefits, which are: having high 
flexibility, a uniform mechanism for naming objects, a great 
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protection mechanism and normal users can add capabilities 
without having special privileges.  
Gong [17] introduced Identity-based CAPability protection 
system (ICAP) to improve capability propagation and revocation 
method of the traditional capability-based access control by 
incorporating subject identities. This enforces better security 
policies during capability propagation as the subjects are now 
traceable. He used an exception list and capability propagation 
trees to enable full revocation of granted capabilities. It was 
proven by Gong [17] that ICAP requires less storage, incur lower 
costs and performs better than prior solutions.  
With the growth of IoT, CapBAC has been adopted in many 
large-scale projects, for example, the European FP7 IoT@Work 
project [23]. Hernández-Ramos et al. [24] later built on the idea 
of PDP framework and introduced DCapBAC (Distributed 
Capability Based Access Control) by embedding authorization 
logic into IoT through Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
optimization or its standard protocols such as a modified Diffie-
Hellman using ECC (ECCDH) [25] or Ellyptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [26]. The ECC is specifically 
designed for constrained environments (light weight), can be used 
in a distributed approach, allows fine-grained and context aware 
authorization decisions [24]. Our work taps on the idea of using 
exception list [17], capability token and PDP framework [23] and 
modify them to suit our needs. 
The software Igor is a hierarchical data store (an eXtensible 
Markup Language, XML repository), an XPath 1.0 [27] 
implementation and a server that allows REST-like [28] access to 
the database. There are different people, IoT devices, plug-ins and 
different Igors interacting with each other. In this paper, these 
different parties are called agents. Igor is primarily state-based, 
unlike ITTT (If This Then That) and many other IoT platforms 
which are primarily event-based. The advantage of state-based is 
that it allows abstraction of information more easily. The 
advantages for Igor to use RESTful web services and Xpath 
expression are fast performance, better reliability and the ability to 
grow (more re-using components) and performing updates 
without affecting the system as a whole. Thus, it is suitable for 
low resource IoT devices. On top of that, fine-grained access 
control can be achieved in a very light way. 
In our project, Igor acts as the main “trusted” device that 
controls all the other connected IoT devices via various plug-ins. 
Once Igor has established the first authenticated connection with 
an IoT device, that connection is assumed to be trusted for all 
future access requests under specified conditions. All the other 
IoT devices or users who want access to that registered device 
would need to first request access via Igor. Igor offers a solution 
to accommodate the communication of heterogenous mix of 
diverse devices. Policy decision points (PDPs) are used to obtain 
authorization decisions. Whenever the subject tries to access an 
object or service, a capability token is presented to the access 
request. PDP decides whether to grant access or not based on the 
received capability and the internal rules defined. 
As Igor is based on XML, various access control policies for 
XML databases have been explored. Bertino et al. [29] introduced 
access control policies that are enforced at DTD (Document Type 
Definitions) level as well as the specific XML document level. 
Their access control model supports positive and negative 
authorization as well as authorization propagation for hierarchical 
data store and documents. The access controls are defined at 
different granularity levels. Two kinds of privileges are supported: 
browsing privileges (read and navigate) and authoring privileges 
(append and write). The propagation policies are also defined by 
Bertino et al. [29]: 
• Cascade: authorization to all direct and indirect levels 
• First level – authorization to all the direct sub-levels 
• None – no authorization propagation is performed 
They also introduced different direction of propagation 
within the XML document or DTD, depending on different 
classification levels: homogenous, heterogeneous and mixed. 
Homogenous level would apply a “top-down” strategy for 
granting authorization, whereas the heterogenous level would 
apply a “bottom-up” strategy for granting authorization. The third 
option is to implement both “top-down” and “bottom-up” 
strategies (mix level). They mentioned that the authorization 
defined at lower levels always supersedes the higher level. This 
proposed model has been implemented on a system called Author-
X [30,31]. Author-X provides an interface for system 
administrators to define access control to XML documents. It 
supports multi-granularity protection objects and 
positive/negative authorizations at document and DTD levels. 
Chebotko et al. [32] later enhanced this access control model by 
introducing graphs matching to analyze if an input query is fully 
acceptable, fully rejected or partially acceptable. They also 
included an index structure for XML element types to speed up 
the processing of access granting. Nevertheless, this solution was 
introduced for large DTDs and is very complex to implement.  
Seitz, Selander and Gehrmaan [33] introduced an 
authorization framework for the IoT. The aim of the framework is 
to allow fine-grained and flexible access control for the 
connection of devices with limited processing power and memory. 
Their approach uses the access control standard called eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [34]. The 
framework that allows definition of differentiated access rules for 
different requesting agents and access control at granularity of 
RESTful resources. Instead of using a full syntax of XACML, 
they proposed a subset of XACML to create a compact JSON-
based [35] assertion standard. This compact assertion is only 10 
percent of the size of the corresponding full XML assertion.  
For the case of Igor, access control at the XML database level 
is sufficient. The concept of propagation, the two types of 
privileges (browsing and authoring), and access controls defined 
at different granularity levels in the XML document have been 
adopted in our proposed access control model. In our solution, the 
framework of Seitz, Selander and Gehrmaan [33] is adopted for 
the access control model proposed for Igor.  
   
3. INTERACTION DESIGN 
This section covers who are the target agents, and examples 
of scenarios applicable for these agents as well as the main 
authorization workflows defined for Igor. 
3.1 Target Agents 
The objective of Igor is to provide security and offer data 
protection for users of IoT devices either at home or office 
locations. The target “agents” of Igor are: 
 
• People/Users – physical users who are usually “owners” 
of the IoT devices, as well as other users who interact or 
 5 
 
would like to view information from the IoT devices 
like the house temperature readings, whether the lights 
are on, etc. 
• Igor – there can be multiple Igor devices, each with 
different tasks to perform, like monitoring hardware 
performance in the server room, controlling who can 
access the office locations, controlling lighting based on 
the presence of inhabitants in the rooms, etc. 
Sometimes, these different Igors interact and share 
information with each other1. 
• Devices – The IoT devices that are controlled by Igor as 
the “helper” of their owners. Once connections have 
been established between these devices and Igor, the 
access to the data and information generated by these 
devices are stored securely in Igor and only authorized 
agents are allowed to view or modify them. 
• Plug-ins – Igor uses different plug-ins to access 
heterogenous IoT devices. These plug-ins stand between 
the devices and Igor. Access has to be granted to these 
plug-ins to ensure that they can only perform functions 
that are allowed such as trigger the lights of the house to 
be on, alert the owners of the house if there are any 
intruders detected through the IoT sensors, etc. 
 
3.2 Scenarios 
 
This section describes the scenarios to illustrate what and 
how access rights are granted to different agents and the relevant 
process flow. 
 
Figure 2 – Scenario of Pauline, Jack, Steven and other IoT 
devices accessing Igor 
3.2.1 Adding new users, devices and plug-ins 
into the Igor system 
As illustrated in Figure 2, Pauline just bought a new smart 
phone. She would like to add this new mobile phone for Igor to 
know whether she is at home or not by detecting the Bluetooth 
                                                                
1 Although interaction between different Igors is possible, it is not implemented in this 
project. 
 
unique ID address of the smart mobile phone. As Pauline is the 
owner of Igor, Pauline has administrator rights to Igor. This 
allows Pauline to log in to Igor and trigger Igor to register the 
mobile phone’s Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) [36] 
address in her profile, so that Igor knows that the UUID address 
belongs to Pauline’s mobile phone.  
Next, she will need to add the BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) 
server. This little server keeps track of which Bluetooth LE 
devices are in range. For each device it remembers when it was 
first seen (and for devices that are no longer available when it was 
last seen). Steps to setup BLE server is available at [37]. The 
Bluetooth LE plug-in is used by Igor to pull data from the BLE 
server into its XML database and triggers Igor if the UUID 
address specified for Pauline’s mobile phone is in range. Once 
detected, Pauline can allow Igor to perform some activities like 
trigger the IoT smart lights (via the Lights Plug-in) of the house to 
be on if it is already dark.  
From the scenario mentioned earlier, when Pauline’s 17-
year-old nephew, Jack comes over to stay for two weeks, she then 
registers Jack and his mobile phone to Igor so that Jack can access 
most of the IoT devices in the house, except the lock of Pauline’s 
study. The IoT sensors in Pauline’s house are also given the rights 
to know when Jack is at home from the UUID address of his 
mobile phone. 
3.2.2 Specifying different access levels 
The different agents accessing Igor have different access 
capabilities. Pauline as the owner of Igor has the full control of all 
the information in Igor, she is able to add new users, plug-ins and 
devices to Igor. Jack is granted access only to the lock of the front 
entrance and the guest room as he is living in her house 
temporarily. The Bluetooth LE plug-in will need to be granted 
access to trigger Igor when Jack’s mobile phone is in range. Igor 
will then trigger Lights Plug-in to switch on the lights of the 
house. The plug-ins only have access to the actions that they are 
allowed to do. 
Steven, the landlord, needs to perform routine service on the 
heating system. As Steven is an external party, Pauline grants 
Steven access to the information of the number of occupants in 
the house, but not who in particular. Via his mobile phone, Steven 
can tell if there is someone at home, so that he can come over to 
service the heating system.  
3.2.3 Editing (Update) the current settings of 
the access rights of the users, devices and 
plug-ins 
If Jack decides to stay longer with Pauline, Pauline then logs 
in to Igor again to extend the capability of Jack to access all the 
IoT devices in the house except for the study. Besides switching 
on the light, Pauline would like Igor to show if there are any 
unknown visitors at home via sensors between 23:00 to 8:00 for 
Jack’s safety. As Pauline is the administrator and the owner of the 
IoT devices, she is able to perform the task of changing the 
settings of Igor and other IoT devices. Jack is not able to perform 
that function as he is only a visitor to the house and he does not 
have the edit rights to the IoT devices settings. 
3.2.4 Delegation 
During Pauline’s holiday, Jack’s parents would like to visit 
Jack for 2 days. Pauline has to delegate her access rights to allow 
other visitors to enter her house to Jack, so that Jack can grant 
 6 
 
access to the front door to his parents. Pauline then logs on to Igor 
and since Jack already has a profile in Igor, she just selects the 
right to delegate access rights to open the main door and assign 
them to Jack. Igor checks if Pauline has the right to delegate the 
capabilities to Jack and if yes, replicate that capability to Jack. If 
necessary, Igor is able to trace back who delegated the access of 
those capabilities to Jack. 
3.2.5 Revocation  
After two weeks, Jack goes home. He no longer needs the 
access to Igor and the IoT devices in Pauline’s house. Pauline 
then logs on to Igor and revokes all the accesses of the user Jack 
and his mobile phone. Igor verifies if Pauline has the access rights 
to perform capability revocation and if yes, the accesses of Jack 
and his mobile phone are removed. Unfortunately, when Pauline 
was on holiday, she lost her mobile phone. Pauline logs on to Igor 
and revokes all accesses related to that mobile phone.  
3.3 Workflows 
This section presents the workflows of the proposed access 
control framework which is based on the CapBAC approach as 
discussed in Section 2. 
3.3.1 Basic Authorization Model  
The basic access control model used by Igor is shown in 
Figure 3.   
 
Figure 3 – Basic access control model 
In a basic access control model, a subject (any agent) 
requests access to a resource (such as thermometer readings or to 
switch on the lights) to Igor. Igor then checks if the request is 
valid and if the Subject has the correct capabilities for the request. 
If yes, Igor will grant access or performs the tasks as requested by 
the Subject towards the Object, else, the request will be denied.  
3.3.2 Performing Actions / Requests 
 
Figure 4 – Igor’s policy checking workflow. 
 
There are two types of requests going to Igor: 
• Request from external devices (for example, the bell button 
would like to trigger the house door bell to ring) – Figure 4 
shows the policy checking workflow for external devices. 
Capabilities are represented in the form of tokens. 
1. the Subject starts the request by presenting R1 (request), 
T1 (token containing the access permissions required to 
perform the task) and K1 (the result of running hash 
function with T1 and the shared symmetric secret key 
between Igor and the Subject). When Igor receives the 
request, Igor will run the same hash function with T1 and 
the shared secret key and checks if the result is the same as 
K1. This is to ensure that the token presented has not been 
tampered with.  
2. If the request is valid, Igor checks if the requested Object 
is registered in Igor. If the Object is not available, the 
request will be denied.  
3. If the Object is found, the Policy Decision Point (PDP) in 
Igor then checks whether T1 contains the access rights 
required for the request. By default, access is always denied 
unless the token/policy assigned to the subject is found and 
access is mentioned. The token content design is covered in 
Section 4.  
4. The PDP reaches a decision (Permit / Deny) and returns 
it to the request service.  
5. If permitted, Igor then sends the access request to the 
Object by also presenting R1 (request), T2 (token 
containing the access permissions required to perform the 
task) and K2 (the result of running the hash function with 
T2 and the shared symmetric secret key between Igor and 
the Object).  
6. The Object repeats the same process in validating 
whether the request from Igor is valid. 
• Request from people (for example, Pauline would like to 
ring the bell by sending a request directly to Igor) – for 
existing users of Igor, their capabilities are contained inside 
their profiles. Therefore, users are only required to produce 
their login ID and passwords to access Igor and send their 
request without the need to present an external token and a 
generated key. Igor then checks if the user has the access 
rights (available capabilities) to perform the request. If yes, 
Igor sends the access request to the Object (similar process 
as mentioned above), if no, the request is rejected. 
 
3.3.3 Subject Updating Capabilities / Data in 
Igor 
Figure 5 shows the process of updating or changing any 
capabilities or data in Igor. The Subject (user) first logins to Igor 
by specifying a login ID and password. Igor checks if the ID and 
password are valid. If yes, the user is successfully logged in, 
otherwise, the login request is rejected. The user then tries to edit 
the capabilities or data in Igor. The Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
in Igor then checks if the user has the right capabilities to carry 
out the action. If yes, the action is permitted otherwise, the action 
request is rejected. 
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Figure 5 – Update Capabilities / Data in Igor  
 
3.3.4 Delegation 
Capabilities that are owned by the Subject can be delegated 
either to a person (user) or another device: 
 
Figure 6 – Delegation process for person 
 Steps for the delegation process as shown in Figure 6: 
1. Pauline logs into Igor (by keying in ID and password) 
and sends a request to delegate the right to access 
Button1 (Token 2) to Jack. It is assumed that Jack has a 
profile in Igor.  
2. The Policy Decision Point (PDP) in Igor responds on the 
access request from Pauline (Subject).  
3. PDP checks the policy on whether Pauline is the owner 
of Token 2 and has the right to delegate the capability. 
4. If yes, Igor executes the Delegation Service, else, the 
request is rejected. 
5. The Delegation Service will first “clone” Token 2 and 
renamed it to Token 3. Token 3 will be stored in his 
profile. Igor informs Jack of his new access via email. 
For traceability, Igor inserts Token 3’s ID in Token 2 as a 
“child” and Token 2 is recorded as “parent” in Token 3. 
Pauline can decide if Jack is allowed to delegate further 
this capability. If yes, Jack is named as the new Subject 
of Token 3, else, Token 3 will not have a Subject named 
and Jack is not allowed to delegate the capability further. 
The process to delegate access to a device is similar to the 
process described for delegation to another user except that Igor 
does not need to inform the device via email but the new token 
contents are transferred and stored on the external device. The 
Token ID is stored in the device’s profile in Igor. It is assumed 
that the communication channel between Igor and the external 
device is secure. 
3.3.5 Transfer Capability 
There is also an option to transfer capabilities to another user 
from the original “owner”. This function works just like 
delegation as discussed in Section 3.3.4 except that the first 
subject (Pauline) no longer has access to the device after the 
capability (Token 6) has been transferred to Jack, as shown in 
Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 – Transfer capability to another user 
 
3.3.6 Remove access (revocation) 
 
Figure 8 – Removing access (Revocation) process 
As shown in Figure 8, subject (Pauline) requests Igor to 
revoke the access rights of an agent (Token 1). The Policy 
Decision Point (PDP) in Igor then checks if the subject has the 
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rights to revoke that access (revocation capability is granted to all 
the owners of devices when these devices are first registered with 
Igor). If no, the request is rejected, else, Igor will send request to 
the Revocation Service to remove Token 1 from the Subject’s 
profile and add them into the Revocation list.  
There are two kinds of capabilities: internal capabilities (that 
are only stored in Igor’s XML database) and external capabilities 
which Igor provided to external IoT devices.  
Only external capabilities will be recorded into the 
Revocation list upon revocation. For external capabilities also, the 
“Refresh” approach is used, where each capability will have a 
limited lifespan (1 year or any other duration specified upon 
creation) and after that date, it will need to be refreshed (to check 
if it has been revoked) with Igor. There is no expiry date for 
internal capabilities. To revoke internal capabilities, the requestor 
must first have the access right to do so and if yes, the capabilities 
are immediately removed from Igor’s XML database. 
 
3.3.7 Adding agents and specifying access 
levels 
All agents need to be registered on Igor before any access 
can be granted. Figure 9 shows the process of adding a new 
device to Igor. 
 
Figure 9 – Adding new device process 
First, both Igor and the new device have to be on the same 
local Wi-Fi2. Then, the new device generates a new identity (ID) 
which also is its Public Key. An example function to generate 
unique ID can be found in [38]. It then sends a connection request 
to Igor together with its ID. As mentioned in Section 2, the 
ECCDH symmetric key agreement protocol can be used to allow 
both Igor and the new device, each having elliptic-curve public–
private key pair to establish a shared secret key. It is assumed that 
the connection establishment channel is secure by using security 
protocol like Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [39]. 
                                                                
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi-Fi 
The owner of the device specifies the access rights to be 
given to the new device. For example, for a new bell button, the 
device owner can grant the device the right to ring the house door 
bell. Igor then generates the message (T1, K1) where K1 = T1* 
(shared secret key). After that, Igor will send the message back to 
the new device and at the same time, insert the unique ID of the 
new capability (T1) in the device owner’s capability profile for 
traceability. At the same time, the new device ID is also stored in 
the device tracking list in Igor. 
For adding new users, Igor will follow the similar process as 
mentioned above but instead of passing the message (T1, K1), 
Igor will create a new profile and asks the new user to specify a 
new password and a unique logon ID for the new user through an 
interface. 
4. SYSTEM DESIGN 
This section covers the hierarchical data store, system 
architecture, token (assertion) design and the access control policy 
for Igor. 
4.1 Hierarchical Data Store 
As mentioned earlier, Igor is basically a hierarchical data 
store (an XML database). There are three basic operations on the 
database [40]: 
• Plugin/ “Helpers” modules – enable the IoT devices to 
modify/update the database (for example, the BLE Plug-
in will update the XML database with all the Bluetooth 
LE devices detected by the BLE Server) 
• Rules – rules which trigger certain actions whenever 
changes in the XML database are detected (for example, 
if Pauline’s mobile UUID is detected, then, Pauline is 
home) 
• Action plugins –  trigger the database changes and allow 
control over external IoT hardware and software (for 
example, if it is getting dark, the “Light On” action 
switches the status and triggers the Light plugin to 
switch on the lights) 
 
Figure 10 – Igor’s BLE device detection 
Figure 10 shows an example of an Igor function, the BLE 
(Bluetooth Low Energy) device detection. In this case, the BLE 
device, BLE server and Lights plug-in are agents. The BLE server 
detects and keeps track of which Bluetooth LE devices are in 
range. Both Igor server and BLE server can be setup on the same 
device. 
4.2 System Architecture 
Figure 11 shows the system architecture for Igor. Igor has 
very low hardware requirements and it can be setup on a 
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Raspberry Pi33 or equivalent devices. As mentioned earlier, Igor 
functions as the “intermediary” between the IoT device owners 
and their heterogenous IoT devices. It is completely self-
contained (not dependent on any cloud infrastructure). This means 
that the IoT devices and Igor can continue to function even if the 
connection to the Internet is down. Igor stores all IoT devices’ 
generated data in its database and owners of the data can decide 
which information to share and with whom. However, Igor can 
work together with cloud based IoT servers and the owners can 
combine this information with other IoT device data. Igor is 
“state-based”, which mean any change in state triggers other 
actions automatically. 
 
Figure 11 – Igor’s System Architecture 
This paper has introduced new security and access control 
modules which comprises five new services:  
• Creation Service – add new agents into the Igor system 
• Edit Services – change the current settings of the access 
rights of the agents. In any case, new tokens are 
generated to replace the old one. 
• Revocation Service – revoke accesses of agents and the 
relevant delegated accesses 
• Policy Decision Point (PDP) – The concept of PDP and 
PAP (Policy Administration Point) has been adapted 
from the XACML architecture [34]. The PDP decides 
whether access should be granted by first validating 
whether the token presented is valid or if the user/device 
is in the revocation list and by the defined policies in 
the PAP. 
• Delegation Service – existing users can delegate all or 
partial of his/her access rights to another person (either 
permanent or temporarily) 
Besides the new access management services, there are other 
modules/components required to complete the access 
authorization and XML database updating processes: 
                                                                
3 https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/raspberry-pi-3-model-b/ 
• Token Generator (Issuer) – as described in Section 
3.3.7, whenever a new agent is added into Igor, tokens 
(capabilities) are generated to define the access rights 
the agent will have. The Token Generator service 
generates these tokens. There are two categories of 
tokens: internal or external. For a new person/user, Igor 
stores new tokens under his/her profile in the main 
XML database (internal) and if the newly added agent is 
an external IoT device, the Token Generator generates 
an external token (T1) and creates the message (T1, K1) 
where K1 = T1* (shared secret key) 
• Updating Services – once the authorization processes 
move completed, the updating services updates the 
XML database with the requested actions 
• (Thin) Client User Interface – users access the 
functionalities of Igor via a thin client user interface 
(UI). The design and development of a user-friendly UI 
is not in the scope of this project 
• Mail server – Igor communicates with new or existing 
users via email by informing them on their new or 
updated ID and password. The mail server enables Igor 
to send emails to these users. The mail server is also not 
in scope for implementation for this project 
 
4.3 Token (Assertion) Design 
As mentioned before, the CapBAC model [24] and the 
authorization framework introduced by [33] are used as a guide 
for the design of the access control policy and authorization 
process for Igor. When an agent is granted access by Igor, the 
Token Generator encodes the authorization decision as a token 
(assertion). The contents of the tokens are used by Igor for the 
enforcement of the access control decisions.  
For a token to be valid and usable, the token presented to 
Igor must contain: 
• Which object/service does the decision apply to? 
• Which actions (create, read, update and delete) do the 
decision apply to? 
• Which subject (agent) does the token belong to? 
• Which Token Generator (ID of Igor) has issued this 
token? 
• Under what conditions are the tokens valid (e.g. expiry 
date, propagation direction, etc.) 
As suggested by [33], a subset of the full XACML and 
SAML [41] standard is adopted to simplify the processing on 
Igor. The format of the token in XML is as shown below: 
<au:capability> 
  <comment>This allows all access to own data</comment> 
  <id>id-pauline-readself</id> 
  <ii>2018-02-15T10:02:52Z</ii> 
  <is>IGOR1</is> 
  <sk>BvDgLAXSHe...0RLhfwS1fue </sk> 
  <obj>/data/identities/pauline</obj> 
   <get>descendant-or-self</get> 
   <put>descendant</put> 
   <post>descendant</post> 
   <delete>descendant</delete> 
   <ob> NB="2018-02-15 12:00:00" NA="2019-02-15 12:00:00"</ob> 
</au:capability> 
The “comment” is just a free text description on what is the 
purpose of the token. The “id” is the token identifier, “ii” is the 
Issue Instant in UTC [42] format, “is” is the identifier of the 
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Assertion Issuer (only available in external token) and “sk” 
(Subject Key) is the owner of the token, using a public key for 
confirmation. “obj” (object) the target resource URI authorized by 
the assertion. “get”, “put”, “post”, “delete” are the actions, with 
propagation type for each action. “ob” is an abbreviated XACML 
Obligation, a local condition that is verified on the device. In this 
case we have not-before (NB) and not-after (NA) times. For 
external token, an additional value is defined: the audience of the 
capability. For the prototype implementation, JSON Web Token 
(JWT) [43] is used by Token Generator in Igor to generate the 
outgoing “Authentication Bearer” header of the external access 
tokens. 
The abstraction is: “Subject may do Action to Resource 
(object) under Conditions and the other values (id, ii, is) are 
administrative (for traceability purposes).  
For example, Pauline (subject) may read, update and delete 
her own profile (object) if the current date is between 2018-02-15 
and 2019-02-15 (obligation). 
 
4.4 Access Control Policy 
 
4.4.1 Propagation 
As Igor is based on an XML database, access control policies 
are enforced as authorization propagation for hierarchical data 
stores. Homogenous level of only "top-down" strategy for 
granting authorization is applied here. Table 2 shows the different 
types of authorization propagation used in Igor. 
Propagation 
Type 
Symbol Description 
Self ° Access to the one 
specified level only 
Child + Access to one level below 
Descendants * Access to all levels below 
Descendants or 
Self 
^ Access to the specified 
level and all the levels 
below it 
No Propagation - No access for all levels 
Table 2 – Types of Authorization propagations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 - Sample part of XML Database 
There are five types of propagation defined for Igor. “Self” 
propagation means access to the one specified level only. In the 
example of XML database in Figure 12, access to the line 02 
<pauline> means the access is defined only for that line. “Child” 
propagation for <pauline> means access is applied to the level 
below <pauline>, which is line 
“<encryptedPassword>Dc6q7d4HA</encryptedPassword>” only. 
“Descendants” propagation means access applies for all levels 
below <pauline>. “Self or Descendants” means access granted for 
that defined level and all the levels below it. “No propagation” 
means the access for that level is not granted. 
4.4.2 Access Control Permission Type 
As an advantage of the CapBAC model, the Principle of 
Least Authority (PoLA) (Least Privilege) is the default [23]. 
Therefore, no agents are able to access any of the data or actions 
defined in Igor unless granted the permission to do so. There are 
four access control permission types defined in Igor as shown in 
Table 3. 
Permission 
Type 
Function Description 
POST Create The capability to create new lines / 
command in the XML database 
GET Read The capability to read the code/data in 
the XML database 
PUT Update The capability to update code/data in the 
XML database 
DELETE Delete The capability to delete code/data in the 
XML database 
Table 3 – Access Control Permission Types 
Fine-grained access control can be achieved with the 
combination of the permission types defined with the propagation 
access control type and these are later mapped with the Xpath of 
the XML database. Figure 13 shows a sample list of access tokens 
defined in Igor’s XML database. Each token is given a unique 
identity (ID). In this example, these tokens belong to Pauline 
(Subject) and the Xpath (object) is defined in each token, with the 
access right permissions. For token ID “1” for example, the 
Object defined is “/data/environment” and the permission “GET” 
assigned to it with the propagation “Descendants or Self”. This 
means that Pauline has the permission to read only the data in 
“/data/environment” and the levels below it. For each user 
registered in Igor, he/she can create, read, update and delete data 
in his/her own profile (as shown as token ID “3” in Figure 13). 
An access control policy table can be drawn for Igor based 
on the concept of mapping each Subject to the access rights 
permission and the propagation type for each Xpath (object) in 
the Igor’s XML database mentioned in the earlier sections. An 
example of the access control policy for Igor can be found in 
Appendix A. Subject can be any agents (people, devices, plug-ins, 
etc.). 
4.5 Scalability 
The advantage of using a state-based XML database is that it 
provides flexibility to add multiple heterogenous IoT devices and 
actions can be defined upon changes in state. However, Igor 
might face inability to cope with overload of concurrent requests. 
This can be overcome by introducing external firewall 
functionality restricting the number of simultaneous requests.  
It is also possible to have multiple Igors working together 
and thus, creating distributed centralized access control devices. 
With the current access control design, there is no limit in adding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
01  <identities> 
02    <pauline>  
03    <encryptedPassword>Dc6q7d4HA 
04    </encryptedPassword> 
05     <au:carries>xxxxxxxxxx</au:carries> 
06     <plugindata> 
07     <ble> 
08      <device> 
09      <id>a4:77:33:c0:5d:8f</id> 
10      <name>chromecast.pauline</name> 
11      </device> 
12     </ble> 
13    </plugindata> 
14   </pauline> 
15  </identities> 
 
“Self” is level 
<pauline> 
 
“Child” of the level 
<pauline>  
 
“Descendants” 
of the level 
<pauline>  
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more IoT devices and defining their actions in this distributed 
ecosystem of private Igors. However, the complexity in managing, 
updating capabilities and revocation lists increases with the 
additional number of Igors interacting with each other.  
 
 
Figure 13 – Sample access token defined in XML Database 
 
4.6 Technical Limitations 
Igor is not built to manage multiple concurrent access to the 
XML database (no access locking mechanism). Some IoT devices 
are vendor locked and users are forced to use their application to 
access and store data in their cloud infrastructure. The lightweight 
database file is not built to store high data loads from connections 
to thousands of IoT devices. However, the threshold of the data 
capacity depends highly on the hardware Igor runs on. In the 
current design also, data sharing through group credentials has not 
been explored. 
During the commissioning of IoT devices to Igor, there could 
be the possibility of an Eavesdropping [44] attack. This can be 
overcome by having secure connections (via HTTPS) and 
performing physical verification that indeed the correct devices 
are connected. Nevertheless, the authentication and encryptions 
methods used in this project are “off-the-shelf” market solutions 
and are suitable for IoT devices. It is assumed that these solutions 
have been extensively tested and proven to be secure. Their 
security weaknesses are not addressed in this project. 
5. IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The implementation part of the proposed framework was 
carried out by setting up Igor on a Raspberry Pi 3. The hardware 
specifications were: 
• Quad Core 1.2GHz Broadcom BCM2837 64bit CPU 
• 1GB RAM 
• BCM43438 wireless LAN and Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) on 
board 
• 16GB MicroSDHC memory card 
• Micro USB power source up to 2.5A 
 
Raspberry Pi 3 was chosen because we wanted a simple, 
small and yet sufficiently powerful device to perform all the 
functionalities required for Igor as the unified access for the IoT.  
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the core of Igor is a 
hierarchical data store (an XML database). Igor is programmed in 
Python 2, which is simple to code and lightweight, suitable for 
constrained devices. All the code is shared as open source in 
Github [45,46] . Igor and other IoT devices are connected through 
Wi-Fi or CoAP [47]. Figure 14 shows the Raspberry Pi 3, Iotsa 
[48] (bell ringer) and smart key finder [49] devices used to test 
the Igor access control framework. We have simulated adding new 
users (Pauline, Jack and Steven) and adding a new Iotsa device to 
Igor. The smart key finder is used to allow Igor to sense a BLE 
device which is tied to a user’s identity.  
 
 
Figure 14 – Raspberry Pi 3, Iotsa (bell ringer) and smart key 
finder used to implement the Igor access control framework 
design 
The secure https [50] protocol is used to create a secure 
channel for Igor to connect to the Internet and other IoT devices. 
One can either buy the SSL certificates [51] from SSL certificate 
vendors like Verisign [52] or to use self-signed certificates. We 
opted for self-signed certificate as it is sufficient to meet our needs 
for this implementation. 
We chose not to perform encryption on internal tokens for 
better performance and because it is assumed that Igor can trust its 
own internal capabilities. For external tokens, there are extra 
fields implemented as compared to the internal tokens, such as the 
Issuer ID, audience of the capability, subject of the capability and 
the period of validity of the token. This is for better traceability 
and to enable security checks on those external tokens when 
presented back to Igor. As mentioned before, JWT is used to 
generate the outgoing “Authentication Bearer” header of the 
external access tokens. It takes a couple of seconds to generate 
 
 
 
 
 
<identities> 
  <pauline> 
    <au:capability> 
    <id>1</id> 
    <comment>Allows reading environment</comment> 
    <obj>/data/environment</obj> 
    <get>descendant-or-self</get> 
    </au:capability> 
    <au:capability> 
    <id>2</id> 
    <comment>This allows reading status 
    </comment> 
    <obj>/data/status</obj> 
    <get>descendant-or-self</get> 
    </au:capability> 
    <au:capability> 
    <id>3</id> 
    <comment>Allows access to own data 
    </comment> 
    <obj>/data/identities/Pauline</obj> 
    <get>descendant-or-self</get> 
    <put>descendant</put> 
    <post>descendant</post> 
    <delete>descendant</delete> 
    </au:capability> 
    <au:capability> 
    <id>4</id> 
    <comment>Allows reading identity existence, 
adding or deleting users</comment> 
    <obj>/identities</obj> 
    <get>self</get> 
    <post>descendant</post> 
    <delete>descendant</delete> 
    </au:capability> 
    <au:capability> 
    <id>5</id> 
    <comment>This allows running 
action/ringringer</comment> 
    <obj>/action/ringringer</obj> 
    <get>self</get> 
    <iss>https://igor.local:9333/issuer</iss> 
    <aud>https://igor.local:9333/data</aud> 
    <cid>1B79E63F-2C8F-439F-A0BE </cid> 
    </au:capability> 
  </pauline> 
</identities> 
 Token ID “3” 
defines that 
the user 
(Pauline) is 
able to create, 
read, update 
and delete her 
profile data  
Identity (ID) of the 
token /capability 
Comments that 
explain the 
function of the 
token  
 
XPath that the 
access applies 
to  
 Access 
permission 
type and 
propagation 
type  
 12 
 
these external tokens because of JWT, but as the number of 
external tokens is far less than the internal ones, performance is 
bearable. 
Different sections of the XML database were added to 
implement the authorization framework [53] : 
• Registered users profile 
(/data/identities/user/au:capability) – stores all the 
capabilities this user carry when logged in 
• Actions profile (/data/actions/action/au:capability) –stores 
the capabilities the respective “action” carry when 
executing. 
• Plug-in data section 
(/data/plugindata/pluginname/au:capability) – stores the 
capabilities the respective plugins carry when executing. 
• External devices section 
(/data/externaldevices/au:capability) – stores the capability 
IDs granted to the respective devices. This allows early 
validation whether the requested device is available in Igor 
• Default capabilities 
(/data/au:access/au:defaultCapabilities) – stores the 
capabilities that are used for any request that has no 
Authentication: Bearer header, or actions, users or plugins 
that do not have their capabilities specified. 
• Profile of symmetric keys (/data/au:access/au:sharedKeys) 
– stored the symmetric keys shared between Igor and a 
single external party. These keys are used to sign outgoing 
capabilities (and check incoming capabilities). Each key is 
stored in an au:sharedKey element with the following 
fields: 
1. iss Issuer. 
2. aud (optional) Audience. 
3. sub (optional) Subject. 
4. externalKey Symmteric key to use. 
5. Keys are looked up either by the combination 
of iss and aud (for outgoing keys) or iss and 
sub (for incoming keys). 
Other design choices that we made during implementation are: 
• Separation of policy administration and checking from the 
XML database. Separate Python modules are used 
(checker.py, capability.py and vars.py) [54] to function as 
the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and PAP (Policy 
Administration Point). This is to enable better code 
management and reduce errors when replicating 
capabilities and performing policy checks. 
• There are several approaches to perform delegation. For 
example, the approach proposed by Gong [17] as 
discussed in Section 2. In our design, the capability owner 
can login to Igor using his/her credentials and delegate the 
capability through a user interface and the receiver of the 
capability is notified through email that he/she is granted 
access to certain objects. We have also given the choice to 
the token owner to specify if the newly delegated token 
can be further delegated by the new owner or not. 
• All external tokens have limited lifespan (1 year or any 
other duration specified upon creation) and a renewal 
process is forced upon the token holder after the expiry 
date. This forces token renewal process for not more than 
1 year, instead for an unlimited duration.  
• Each agent (device, people, plug-ins, other Igors) have 
their own profiles or listing in the XML database where 
the assigned capabilities and other credentials (e.g. logon 
ID, passwords, secret keys, etc.) are stored for ownership 
tracking purpose. 
• For this implementation, Igor and the external IoT devices 
use secret symmetric keys to establish trust and JWT is 
used to transfer generated token from the “token 
generator” in Igor to the external IoT devices.   
Simple user interfaces are implemented to demonstrate the 
workings of the access control design. Some of the screens 
implemented for the prototype of Igor can be found in 
Appendix B.  
 
6. EVALUATION 
 
In this section, we discuss the evaluation conducted with IoT 
security and privacy issues experts, performance assessment of the 
system and summarise the results. 
6.1 Goals  
Our first goal was to test our prototype and obtain feedback 
on the design of fine-grained access control mechanism with 
experts in IoT access control, familiar with the ethical and privacy 
issues related to them. There are three parts of the evaluation:  
• To test whether the solution covers all the six 
requirements discussed in the introduction of this paper. 
• To assess if the design choices made are acceptable. 
• To gather general feedback from experts on how they 
feel about the usefulness of the solution and discuss any 
improvement points. 
An additional goal was to perform comparison of the 
response time of the system before and after the implementation 
of the proposed security framework. 
6.2 Method 
Evaluation forms were prepared as shown in Appendix C. 
Separate evaluation sessions were conducted with five experts 
independently. These experts are selected for their experience and 
knowledge in security around IoT devices. Three of them are from 
an international company and have experience as security 
administrators and run projects related to IoT. One of them is an 
IoT security scientist from a renowned research organization and 
another one is a lead cyber scientist who published journals and 
books on high performance computing, cyber security and IoT. 
The design and functionalities of the security framework of 
Igor explained and later tests were done on the prototype and 
feedback captured. This is a qualitative evaluation and is 
subjective to the experts’ personal opinions. The Likert Scale [55] 
was used (0 the lowest and 5 the highest) to measure whether the 
project meets the overall objectives in addressing ethical and 
privacy issues users are facing regarding information generated by 
IoT devices.  
For measuring the response time of the system, Apache 
Benchmarking (ab) [56] tool was used. Measurements were taken 
to compare the difference of response time before and after the 
implementation of the proposed security framework for: 
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• Loading the first landing page of Igor (with and without 
https) 
• Executing a read (GET) request function 
• Executing an update (PUT) request function 
• Executing an add (POST) request function 
 
6.3 Results 
 
6.3.1 Expert Evaluation Results 
 
The detailed results of the evaluation can be found in 
Appendix D. The main results of the evaluation are discussed 
here: 
 
a) Lack of friendly user interface for current prototype 
As the objective of the prototype implementation is to 
demonstrate the authorization framework of the proposed 
solution, user-friendly interfaces and automation of some 
of the steps are still lacking (Appendix B). Designing 
friendly user interface is out of scope for this project. 
Although all of the experts interviewed can understand 
easily the proposed solution, almost all of the them feel 
that friendly user interfaces and automation would help 
normal users to understand better how the system would 
actually work in real life. 
 
b) Capability transfer should be retractable 
In the current design, revocation of capabilities can be 
done after they have been delegated. When capabilities 
are transferred to a new owner, the action is irreversible. 
It is suggested to cater for any mistake done in 
transferring and allow the administrator or special 
privileged user to reverse the action. 
 
c) Risk of having centralized revocation list for external 
capabilities  
All of the evaluators agree that the approach of using a 
revocation list to revoke external capabilities is a good 
approach. However, at least two of the evaluators raised 
the concern that there are complications if a revocation 
list is corrupted or unreachable because of malicious 
attacks, especially if the revocation list is centralized and 
many Igors are sharing one list. It is suggested to have 
distributed revocation lists to lower the risk of depending 
on one centralized list. 
 
d) Separation of policy administration and checking from 
the XML database is a good design 
Four of the evaluators feel that the separation of the main 
Igor database from the policy administration and 
checking, e.g. the Policy Decision Point and Policy 
Administration point, is a good design as it enables easier 
code maintenance and reduce errors when performing 
policy checks. 
 
e) The capability delegation approach is easy to 
understand 
All of the evaluators feel that the proposed capability 
delegation approach is easy and simple. However, the 
automation of this process can be improved for external 
capabilities as the current implementation still needs 
manual intervention from users to “copy and paste” the 
JWT generated the to external IoT devices. 
 
f) External capabilities should have limited lifespan 
All of the evaluators agree that the external capabilities 
should have limited lifespan. However, flexibility should 
be given to the capability owners to decide how long is 
the lifespan during the generation of new external 
capabilities. For future expansion, careful thought should 
be given on how to cater for generation of external 
capabilities by multiple Igors and multiple revocation 
lists. 
 
g) Internal capabilities do not need to be encrypted 
In the current implementation, there are two types of 
capabilities: internal and external. Internal capabilities 
are used to control access to data, actions and plugins 
within the Igor’s database. For better performance, 
internal capabilities do not to use any encryptions. All 
the evaluators think this is an acceptable solution with 
the assumption that the access to the XML file is secure. 
 
h) Performance is good and acceptable 
All of the evaluators agree that the subjective 
performance of the system provided is good and 
acceptable. One of them even challenged us to use more 
basic hardware such as Arduino [57] instead of the 
Raspberry Pi. 
 
As a summary, all of the evaluators agree that the project 
requirements mentioned in Section 1 are met with the ranking of 4 
or higher (Likert Scale). They feel that the proposed solution is 
very useful in solving the problem and use case presented in the 
beginning of the paper. All of them agree that the prototype 
presented is sufficient to demonstrate how the proposed solution 
works. With the feedback collected, we are able to redesign and 
improve further the proposed access control framework. 
 
6.3.2 Performance Measurement Results 
 
 
Figure 15 – Mean value of the response time for loading the front 
page of Igor, executing GET, PUT and POST requests before and 
after implementation of the security framework 
Figure 15 shows the breakdown of the response time before 
and after the implementation of the security framework for Igor. 
The readings are based on the time taken for 10 concurrent 
sessions of 100 requests in milliseconds. There is minimal 
difference between the time of loading the first page of Igor and 
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for executing GET and PUT requests. However, a greater 
difference in response time is observed when POST requests are 
executed with access control checking, which is about 3.5 seconds 
(470% increase) as shown in Table 4. The readings of the system 
average load performance are also taken but they show no 
significant difference despite the longer response time when 
security checks are performed. 
 
 
Table 4 – Comparison of system response time before and after 
implementation of the security framework for Igor 
In summary, performance degradation of the system after the 
implementation of the security framework for Igor in a lightweight 
device is acceptable. This fulfils the R6 requirement mentioned in 
Section 1. 
 
7. DISCUSSION 
During the development and evaluation phases of the access 
control framework a few points for discussion have been raised: 
a) XML database design 
The current design uses an XML database with Xpath 
expression and RESTful web services. The Xpath expression has 
produced fast performance, high reliability and flexibility to grow 
for lightweight IoT devices. The proposed authorization 
propagation types are designed for an XML database. 
Nevertheless, the design is not tied to XML and should be 
generic. Similar implementation can also be achieved using 
another simple file format like JSON. 
b) REST versus SOAP 
Two very popular approaches to access Web services are: 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) and Representational 
State Transfer (REST) [58]. Both approaches have their 
advantages and disadvantages. REST is chosen in our case as it is 
simpler to use, flexible and provides a lighter weight alternative. 
The four different HTTP 1.1 verbs (GET, POST, PUT, and 
DELETE) provides a simple and light solution for Igor. 
Furthermore, REST is not limited to XML but it can also output 
to CSV [59], JSON and RSS [60]. Therefore, for future expansion 
opportunity for IoT solution, REST is a better option. 
c) Higher security or better performance 
The main challenge is to create an access control framework 
that is functional and applicable to solve the research problem in 
sharing information to certain people or devices at a fine-grained 
level without compromising on performance and requiring high 
hardware specifications. The question is how much security can 
you get while maintaining a performing system? All the evaluators 
feel that performance is acceptable even when the capabilities and 
policy checking are implemented on Igor. However, this is a 
subjective assessment. Security checks and access granting should 
be seamless allowing users to continue their tasks on the IoT 
devices without interruptions. Automation is also key to the 
success of the solution as users should not notice the verification 
and validations performed by Igor or on the IoT devices. 
d) Adopting available security solutions and 
authentication methods 
The current implementation of https secure protocol and 
shared symmetric key generations are based on the off-the-shelf 
security solutions available in the market today. Shall security 
technology change with new and more secure authentication and 
encryption solutions, it should be easy to adopt those changes in 
the future versions of Igor. 
e) Hardware performance baseline 
As part of the feedback gathered from the evaluators, 
hardware specifications for IoT devices are improving rapidly 
with higher specifications being built, the sizes of the devices are 
shrinking with every new version at cheaper price. Therefore, the 
performance benchmark gathered with the current implementation 
on the Raspberry Pi 3 and Iotsa devices would quickly be 
outdated when new and better versions of IoT devices are released 
in the market. Nevertheless, the performance measurements 
gathered are important to prove that the proposed solution is 
lightweight and suitable for constrained IoT devices. 
f) Centralized versus decentralized solution 
In the proposed access control mechanism, Igor performs 
centralized checks on all access requests to all devices, services 
and actions. There are concerns that this is a single point of failure 
or this approach carries a high risk in the event the single Igor is 
attacked. However, the current design has capabilities assigned to 
every component in Igor that if one component is attacked, the 
others will still be protected. In a way, allowing different 
capability owners to grant access to their own capabilities is a 
decentralized approach [61]. Having a centralized access control 
approach carries its own benefits as well [62]. The proposal of 
having multiple Igors working together to control accesses to 
different IoT devices is trying to get the best of both approaches - 
decentralized centralization. 
 
8. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
With the rapid growth of the data generated by IoT devices, 
users are facing ethical issues in how the data are handled. 
Mason's [3] PAPA model (privacy, accuracy, property and 
accessibility) presents the main ethical issues hitting the data 
management effort in the IoT industry. More and more IoT users 
are seeking ways to control accesses to data generated by the IoT 
devices they own, even to a detailed level (fine-grained). The 
main aim of this paper is to work on how to solve data 
ethical/privacy issues related to IoT as defined by Mason’s PAPA 
model. This paper presents a fine-grained access control solution 
framework on Igor, a centralized home and office automation 
solution which is also called the unified access to the IoT to solve 
the data sharing and access issues. Data collected from IoT 
devices are stored in a centralized location controlled by the data 
owner and all accesses are controlled and granted through Igor.  
CapBAC has been identified as access control model suitable 
to meet the objectives for this project. Among many access 
control approaches, the CapBAC solution is the most proven one 
and has been used since 1966 [19]. One of the main advantage is 
that it solves the “confused deputy problem” [63] where the 
system is tricked in believing the presenter has the right to access 
a request which it actually does not. The implementation, expert 
evaluation results and performance measurements taken show this 
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is a promising solution for securing access to data generated by 
IoT devices. 
Based on the evaluations conducted, there are still room for 
improvement in future work: 
a) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
The current design of Igor ensures highest privacy settings by 
default. No user or device can access to any information unless it 
is granted by the owner of the capability. More analysis need to be 
done to see how Igor’s design can help to further enforce the 
General Data Protection Regulation introduced by the European 
Union [64] for IoT devices.  
b) Authentication mechanism 
The current implementation of the authentication mechanism 
covers checking mutual shared symmetric keys and the ID and 
password presented by the user who wants to login to Igor to view 
the data they are granted access to. More work should be done to 
analyze the strengths and weaknesses of different authentication 
approaches for IoT devices and select the best solution for Igor. 
The current implementation uses a self-signed SSL certificate 
which is not trusted by Internet browsers. To solve this, the 
implementation can be done using a trusted SSL certificate 
generated by a trusted certificate authorities like Let’s Encrypt 
[65] and Verisign.  
c) User-friendly Interfaces 
Adoption of the proposed access control mechanism will 
increase once user-friendly interfaces are built for novice users. 
Users should be able to select the list of devices managed by Igor 
and to view what actions are available for each of the devices. 
Once found, users can easily select which access to the data or 
actions they want to grant to their chosen users or devices. All 
creation, modification, delegation and transfer of capabilities 
should be seamless and easy to perform via a single user interface 
accessible by different mobile devices (e.g. mobile phones, tablets 
or laptops).  
d) Capabilities templates and definition of user groups 
For future implementation, each person or device should be 
given a set of default capabilities with pre-defined templates 
which can be assigned to different user groups. Access 
capabilities can be grouped by the owner’s preference such as 
family group, external parties, cleaners, etc. For example, for 
those who are categorized as “family”, they can have access to all 
sensitive information related to the household like the power 
utilization trends, who is in the house at certain times, room 
temperature readings, etc. The group only needs to be defined 
once and all the other subsequent access management can be done 
automatically by selecting the defined groups. A similar concept 
can be applied when granting access to different IoT devices. 
e) Autonomous external capabilities renewal and easy 
delegation to external parties 
External capabilities have a limited lifespan as defined upon 
creation. The renewal of these capabilities should happen 
autonomously whenever the capabilities are presented by the 
subject to request access to certain objects, with the condition that 
these capabilities are not listed in the revocation list. This 
approach keeps these external capabilities fresh and in check. 
More work needs to be done to define how the holder of external 
capabilities can further delegate them to other parties. For 
example, a service manager for the IoT devices should be able to 
grant short-term access to these devices to his colleagues who 
need to support and perform maintenance on these devices. 
However, they cannot delegate further the granted capabilities 
which expire after being used once. 
 
e) Interaction between multiple Igors and revocation lists 
The current design allows different Igors to connect with 
each other as separate devices. However, this is not fully tested 
and implemented in this paper. More work needs to be done to 
review all the different approaches for high volume capabilities 
creation or the possibility of sharing revocation lists when there 
are more than one Igors in the household or office ecosystem. In 
the event one Igor is being hacked or attacked, for example, by a 
DDos attack [66] other Igors in the ecosystem should continue to 
function and the attack should only be contained to that one 
impacted Igor.  
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Appendix A 
Example of Access Control Policy for Igor 
“Object” Description Pauline (Admin 
with Full Access 
Rights) 
Jack 
(Sub-
Admin) 
Steven 
(Normal 
User) 
Frank (guest) Button1 
(Device) 
Button2 
(Device) 
data/environment The status of the 
environment (e.g. 
whether it is at night, in 
the morning, if there is a 
message, etc) 
Default capability 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
R^ 
 
R^ 
 
- - 
data/status/ Default capability. 
This allows reading status 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
R^ 
 
R^ 
 
- - 
data/status/igor/save  C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
R^ 
 
R^ 
 
  
data/status/igor/web  C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
R^ 
 
R^ 
 
  
data/sensors   C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
  - - 
data/services/igor Default capability. 
Different types of 
services (e.g. 
announcetime service, 
createtoken service) to 
show on the dashboard 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
R^ 
 
R^ 
 
- - 
/static Default capability. This 
allows reading static web 
pages 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
R^ 
 
R^ 
 
- - 
/internal/accessControl Default capability. 
This allows accessing 
capability information 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
R^ 
 
R^ 
 
- - 
data/people To detect if the person is 
present or not (Boolean 
value) 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
R^ 
 
- - - 
data/identities 
  
Each person/device are 
provided a profile with 
information like token, 
MAC address, etc 
R+ 
C+ 
D+ 
R+ 
C+ 
- - - - 
data/identities 
/pauline 
 C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
R° 
C° 
- - - - 
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“Object” Description Pauline (Admin 
with Full Access 
Rights) 
Jack 
(Sub-
Admin) 
Steven 
(Normal 
User) 
Frank (guest) Button1 
(Device) 
Button2 
(Device) 
data/identities 
/jack 
Jack can access to his 
own data in his profile. 
Administrator cannot 
read the detail content in 
his profile but he/she can 
remove his identity 
R° 
C° 
D° 
R^ 
C* 
U* 
D* 
- - - - 
data/identities 
/steven 
Steven can access to his 
own data in his profile. 
Administrator cannot 
read the detail content in 
his profile but he/she can 
remove his identity 
R° 
C° 
D° 
R° 
C° 
R^ 
C* 
U* 
D* 
- - - 
data/identities 
/frank 
Frank can access to his 
own data in his profile. 
Administrator cannot 
read the detail content in 
his profile but he/she can 
remove his identity 
R° 
C° 
D° 
R° 
C° 
- R^ 
C* 
U* 
D* 
-  
Data/actions Actions to be performed 
within Igor 
C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
R^ 
C^ 
U^ 
R^ 
  
R^ 
 
  
Data/actions/pressbutton1  C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
R° 
C° 
- - R^ 
U* 
- 
Data/actions/pressbutton2  C^ 
R^ 
U^ 
D^ 
R° 
C° 
- - - R^ 
U* 
 
 
  
Legend 
 Permission  Symbols  Propagation 
C 
R 
U 
D 
Create (POST) 
Read (GET) 
Update (PUT) 
Delete (DELETE) 
 ° 
+ 
* 
^ 
- 
Self 
Child 
Descendants 
Self or Descendants 
No propagation 
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Appendix B - User Interfaces for Igor 
 
Main Page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Login Page 
 
Shows who is currently 
logged in  
Logout button  
User name textbox  
Log-in button  
Password textbox  
Link to system health 
dashboard 
Link to login page 
Link to view XML 
database (only accessible 
for those who have 
access) 
Link to capability listing 
page 
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Capabilities Listing Page 
 
 
 
 
 
Click to transfer, delegate or 
export capability Click to revoke 
 
Default 
capabilities 
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Appendix C – Evaluation Guidelines 
Guideline for the Interviewers 
Below you will find all the questions. It’s important to read the comment section to ask the questions in such a way that you don’t 
influence the answer. Since it’s qualitative research, don’t be afraid to continuously throw the “Why?” question. It’s advised that you 
record and immediately write down the answers. 
Evaluation Questions 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Get to know about person’s expertise in IoT and Access Control Security models 
Intro What is your education level? (BSc, MSc, 
PhD) 
 
Intro How do you describe your knowledge level 
on IoT and Access Control security models? 
 
Adding New Device / User 
a) Requirement 1: New users or devices can be easily added to be IoT solution 
Scenario Questions Comments 
Adding a new user pauline • Is it easy to add a new user? 
• Is it easy to add capabilities to new 
user? 
• Any improvement points? 
 
Adding new devices: Button1 and Ringer • Is it easy to add a new device? 
• Any improvement points? 
 
Delegation & Transfer 
b) Requirement 2 : Access control can be delegated from the owner to others 
Scenario Questions Comments 
Login as admin.  
Go to the Capabilities list screen. Delegate the capability to view 
/data/profiles/Pauline to user Pauline 
Login as Pauline, check whether you have access to information 
in Pauline’s profile. 
 
Transfer a capability to jack. Once transferred, the capability will 
no longer available to the first owner. 
 
Login as jack, check whether jack is able to access to the 
information that you just transferred.  
 
Note: Delegation/transfer can only be done for users/devices that 
are already registered with Igor 
• Is it easy to delegate capabilities to new 
users / devices 
• Any improvement points? 
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Revocation 
c) Requirement 3 : Access control can be revoked by the owners when not needed anymore 
Scenario Questions Comments 
Login as admin. Revoke the capability that you just delegated to 
Pauline.  
 
Logout. Login as Pauline. Go to the capabilities screen. Check if 
the capability is now removed from your capability list. 
 
Note: There are 2 types of capabilities: internal and external 
capabilities. External capabilities are assigned to external IoT 
devices.  
• Is it useful to revoke access? 
 
• Any improvement points? 
 
Fine-grained access control 
d) Requirement 4 : Access control of data should be to the detailed level (fine-grained) 
Scenario Questions Comments 
Login as ID: admin  
 
Go to the Capabilities list screen. Grant access to Pauline the 
information in /data/people/jack/device 
 
Logout. Login as Pauline. Check if Pauline is able to see the 
information in /data/people/jack/device 
• Is the access control model fine-grained 
enough? 
 
• Any improvement points? 
 
Easily Managed and Modified 
e) Requirement 5 : Access control should be easily managed and modified for normal users 
Scenario Questions Comments 
Login as ID: pauline  
Go to the Capabilities list screen 
Try to modify access for the capabilities granted to Jack 
 
• Is it useful to manage and modify 
access? 
• Is this function simple and easy? 
• Any improvement points? 
 
Lightweight – suitable for IoT devices 
f) Requirement 6 : Access control solution should be lightweight as IoT devices have low processing power (with acceptable 
performance) 
Scenario Questions Comments 
The implementation part of the proposed framework is carried 
out by setting up Igor on a Raspberry Pi 3. The core of Igor are 
an XML database, a web server and Xpath 1.0.  
Is the performance acceptable? 
 
Any improvement points? 
 
Other design choices (Optional) 
Area Questions Comments 
Design choice 1 - Separation of policy administration and 
checking from the XML database. A separate Python module is 
used (access.py) to function as the Policy Decision Point (PDP) 
and PAP (Policy Administration Point). This is to enable better 
code management and reduce errors when replicating capabilities 
and performing policy checks 
Do you think this design is useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
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Design choice 2 - There are several approaches to perform 
delegation. Gong’s approach is for the initiator to create a 
delegation message and pass it to the person who need the 
capability. He/she will then request access from the access server 
by presenting the message from the owner and the access server 
will then generate new capability and assign it to the requestor. 
We did not go with that approach as it presents too many steps 
and is cumbersome for the users. Instead, the capability owner 
can login to Igor using his/her credentials and delegate the 
capability through a user interface and the receiver of the 
capability will be notified through email that he/she has been 
granted access to certain objects. We have also given the choice 
to the token owner to specify if the newly delegated token can be 
further delegated by the new owner or not. 
Do you think this design is useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
 
 
Design choice 3 - We have also made the choice to enforce that 
all external tokens have limited lifespan (1 year) and a renewal 
process is forced upon the token holder after the expiry date.  
Do you think this design is useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
 
Design choice 4 - Each agent (device, people, plug-ins, other 
Igors) have their own profiles or listing in the XML database 
where the assigned capabilities and other credentials (e.g. logon 
ID, passwords, secret keys, etc.) are stored for ownership 
tracking purpose 
Do you think this design is useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
 
 
Design choice 5 - We have chosen to have two types of 
capabilities: internal and external. Internal capabilities are used 
to control access to data, actions and plugins within the Igor’s 
database. For better performance, internal capabilities do not to 
use any encryptions. External capabilities are used by Igor to 
control access for external IoT devices that are requesting 
services from Igor. For this implementation, Igor and the external 
IoT devices use secret symmetric keys to establish trust and JWT 
is used to transfer generated token from the “token generator” in 
Igor to the external IoT devices 
Do you think this design is useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
 
Summary 
Questions Comments  
What is your overall feedback about the usefulness of the design 
of the fine-grained access control for Igor? 
  
How would you rate whether the project meets the overall 
objectives in address ethical/privacy issues we are facing 
regarding information generated by IoT devices? 
Rating from 1 – 5 (where 1 is the lowest and 
5 the highest) 
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Appendix D – Detail Results of the Expert Evaluation (Part 1: Expert 1-3) 
 
    Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 
Profile         
What is your education level   MSc MSc PhD 
How do you describe your knowledge level on IoT 
and Access Control security models   Expert Expert Moderate - Expert 
Adding New Device / User         
a) Requirement 1: New users or devices can be easily added to be IoT solution       
Adding a new user pauline 
• Is it easy to add a new user? 
• Is it easy to add capabilities to new 
user? 
• Any improvement points? 
Yes, easy to add 
use/capabilities, 
however, there is 
no friendly UI Yes Yes 
Adding new devices: Button1 and Ringer 
• Is it easy to add a new device? 
• Any improvement points? 
Yes, however, there 
is no friendly UI Yes Yes 
Delegation & Transfer         
b) Requirement 2 : Access control can be delegated from the owner to others       
Login as admin.  
Go to the Capabilities list screen. Delegate the 
capability to view /data/profiles/Pauline to user 
Pauline 
Login as Pauline, check whether you have access to 
information in Pauline’s profile. 
Transfer a capability to jack. Once transferred, the 
capability will no longer available to the first owner. 
Login as jack, check whether jack is able to access 
to the information that you just transferred.  
Note: Delegation/transfer can only be done for 
users/devices that are already registered with Igor 
• Is it easy to delegate capabilities to 
new users / devices? 
• Any improvement points? Yes Yes 
Yes. Provided that 
the person/devices 
first establish trust 
with Igor. I don’t 
really see this as 
“delegation” if the 
trust is not fully 
established first 
with Igor. External 
token delegation 
makes sense as it is 
given to an external 
device.  
Revocation         
c) Requirement 3 : Access control can be revoked by the owners when not needed 
anymore       
Login as admin. Revoke the capability that you just 
delegated to Pauline.  
Logout. Login as Pauline. Go to the capabilities 
screen. Check if the capability is now removed from 
your capability list. 
Note: There are 2 types of capabilities: internal and 
external capabilities. External capabilities are 
assigned to external IoT devices.  
• Is it useful to revoke access? 
 
• Any improvement points? Yes 
Yes. The 
revocation list for 
external capability 
is a good idea. 
However, how do 
we handle if the 
revocation list gets 
corrupted or lost? 
There is another 
option to keep a 
"key list" and 
delete the list if not 
needed anymore? Yes, good design. 
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Fine-grained access control         
d) Requirement 4 : Access control of data should be to the detailed level (fine-grained)       
Login as ID: admin 
 
Go to the Capabilities list screen. Grant access to 
Pauline the information in /data/people/jack/device 
 
Logout. Login as Pauline. Check if Pauline is able 
to see the information in /data/people/jack/device 
• Is the access control model fine-
grained enough? 
 
• Any improvement points? Yes 
Yes. Good fine-
grained. 
Suggestion to use 
template for 
access. E.g. a 
device comes with 
a "set of 
capabilities" 
granted to it or to 
its owners. New 
devices will have 
list of actions it 
can perform, along 
with list of 
capabilities Yes 
Easily Managed and Modified         
e) Requirement 5 : Access control should be easily managed and modified for normal 
users       
Login as ID: pauline  
Go to the Capabilities list screen 
Try to modify access for the capabilities granted to 
Jack 
Access need to be revoked, then, delegate a new 
capability with new obligations 
• Is it useful to manage and modify 
access? 
• Is this function simple and easy? 
• Any improvement points? Yes Yes, simple Yes 
Lightweight – suitable for IoT devices         
f) Requirement 6 : Access control solution should be lightweight as IoT devices have 
low processing power (with acceptable performance)       
The implementation part of the proposed framework 
is carried out by setting up Igor on a Raspberry Pi 3. 
The core of Igor are an XML database, a web server 
and Xpath 1.0.  
Is it performing well? 
 
Any improvement points? 
Yes, performance is 
good 
Yes, performance 
is good. Don’t 
really need to do 
performance test 
as the hardware 
will always change 
when we want to 
go to production. 
We can choose the 
higher spec for 
example, as price 
drops all the time. 
Suggestion to use 
lower end hardware 
for Igor, e.g. 
Arduino instead of 
Raspberry Pi. 
Performance is 
good now. 
Other design choices         
Design choice 1 - Separation of policy 
administration and checking from the XML 
database. A separate Python module is used 
(access.py) to function as the Policy Decision Point 
(PDP) and PAP (Policy Administration Point). This 
is to enable better code management and reduce 
errors when replicating capabilities and performing 
policy checks 
Do you think this design is useful? 
Why? 
 
Any improvement points? Yes, design is 
useful Yes, good design No comment 
Design choice 2 - There are several approaches to 
perform delegation. Gong’s approach is for the 
initiator to create a delegation message and pass it 
to the person who need the capability. He/she will 
then request access from the access server by 
presenting the message from the owner and the 
access server will then generate new capability and 
assign it to the requestor. We did not go with that 
approach as it presents too many steps and is 
cumbersome for the users. Instead, the capability 
owner can login to Igor using his/her credentials and 
delegate the capability through a user interface and 
the receiver of the capability will be notified 
through email that he/she has been granted access to 
certain objects. We have also given the choice to the 
token owner to specify if the newly delegated token 
can be further delegated by the new owner or not. 
Do you think this design is useful? 
Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
Yes, design is 
useful 
Good, simple 
design Yes 
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Design choice 3 - We have also made the choice to 
enforce that all external tokens have limited lifespan 
(1 year) and a renewal process is forced upon the 
token holder after the expiry date.  
Do you think this design is useful? 
Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
With condition its 
autonomous. If not, 
its not a good idea. 
Perhaps to give the 
owner options to 
specify if expiry 
date is required. I 
do not want to 
renew the tokens 
even once a year 
Yes, its ok. 
Renewal should be 
automated. Owner 
should be able to 
choose the lifespan 
of the token during 
creation. 
This should be 
dynamic, not tied to 
a specific duration. 
But the lifespan 
concept is good. 
Design choice 4 - Each agent (device, people, plug-
ins, other Igors) have their own profiles or listing in 
the XML database where the assigned capabilities 
and other credentials (e.g. logon ID, passwords, 
secret keys, etc.) are stored for ownership tracking 
purpose 
Do you think this design is useful? 
Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
Yes, it is easy to 
maintain Yes Yes 
Design choice 5 - We have chosen to have two types 
of capabilities: internal and external. Internal 
capabilities are used to control access to data, 
actions and plugins within the Igor’s database. For 
better performance, internal capabilities do not to 
use any encryptions. 
Do you think this design is useful? 
Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
Yes, very obvious, 
common sense Yes Yes 
Summary         
What is your overall feedback about the usefulness 
of the design of the fine-grained access control for 
Igor?   Useful Good, very useful Useful 
Other comments   
I feel this is a good 
design - if there are 
good UI and 
enough plug-ins to 
connect to Igor. 
Currently, its not 
very user friendly. 
The prototype 
works well with 
centralized home 
environment, 
within the same 
network. How 
about devices 
spread across 
different networks? 
Have multiple 
Igors across 
different locations 
and different 
access technology 
(Bluetooth, 
Zigbee, Z-Wave, 
6LowPAN)? 
Maybe to have 
Igor sitting in the 
gateway? 
How about 
working with other 
off the shelf 
harware like 
Printer? I need to 
write my own 
plug-in? 
Problem with 
centralized control 
is that if Igor is 
hacked, all the 
secret keys are 
being 
compromised? 
To improve on the 
current design, 
instead of having 
one Igor as token 
generator 
(centralized), why 
not use multiple 
Igors (group of 
Igors) and these 
collectively create a 
secret key for new 
persons/devices or 
any Igor can be 
randomly appointed 
to create the secret 
key? For example, 
with the concept of 
blockchain, secret 
key can be 
generated by any 
node in the chain. 
The demonstration 
can be better with 
more user-friendly 
interfaces and more 
automation – future 
work. 
How would you rate whether the project meets the 
overall objectives in addressing ethical/privacy 
issues we are facing regarding information 
generated by IoT devices? 
Rating from 1 – 5 (where 1 is the 
lowest and 5 the highest) 5 5 4.5 
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Appendix C – Detail Results of the Expert Evaluation (Part 2: Expert 4-5) 
 
    Expert 4 Expert 5 
Profile       
What is your education level   PhD MSc 
How do you describe your knowledge level on IoT 
and Access Control security models   Expert Moderate - Expert 
Adding New Device / User       
a) Requirement 1: New users or devices can be easily added to be IoT solution     
Adding a new user pauline 
• Is it easy to add a new user? 
• Is it easy to add capabilities to 
new user? 
• Any improvement points? 
Yes. User friendly interfaces are not 
available now, but can be future work and 
it’s not in the current requirement Yes, but lack friendly UI 
Adding new devices: Button1 and Ringer 
• Is it easy to add a new device? 
• Any improvement points? Yes Yes 
Delegation & Transfer       
b) Requirement 2 : Access control can be delegated from the owner to others     
Login as admin.  
Go to the Capabilities list screen. Delegate the 
capability to view /data/profiles/Pauline to user 
Pauline 
Login as Pauline, check whether you have access 
to information in Pauline’s profile. 
Transfer a capability to jack. Once transferred, the 
capability will no longer available to the first 
owner. 
Login as jack, check whether jack is able to access 
to the information that you just transferred.  
Note: Delegation/transfer can only be done for 
users/devices that are already registered with Igor 
• Is it easy to delegate 
capabilities to new users / 
devices? 
• Any improvement points? 
Yes. Question: For transferring 
capabilities, how about when the owner or 
the Admin “accidentally” transferred 
wrong rights to the wrong person/device?  
Currently, there is no way to take the 
capability back?  Suggest to have a “special 
privileged” role (administrator, etc) to be 
able to recover / revoke transferred 
capabilities – For future work Yes 
Revocation       
c) Requirement 3 : Access control can be revoked by the owners when not needed 
anymore     
Login as admin. Revoke the capability that you 
just delegated to Pauline.  
Logout. Login as Pauline. Go to the capabilities 
screen. Check if the capability is now removed 
from your capability list. 
Note: There are 2 types of capabilities: internal 
and external capabilities. External capabilities are 
assigned to external IoT devices.  
• Is it useful to revoke access? 
 
• Any improvement points? 
Yes. Revocation list is acceptable solution, 
but do bear in mind there are weaknesses 
in revocation list and assume it is never 
corrupted, hacked, etc. 
Yes. Revocation list is a 
good solution 
Fine-grained access control       
d) Requirement 4 : Access control of data should be to the detailed level (fine-
grained)     
Login as ID: admin 
Go to the Capabilities list screen. Grant access to 
Pauline the information in 
/data/people/jack/device 
Logout. Login as Pauline. Check if Pauline is able 
to see the information in /data/people/jack/device 
• Is the access control model 
fine-grained enough? 
 
• Any improvement points? Yes Yes 
Easily Managed and Modified       
e) Requirement 5 : Access control should be easily managed and modified for 
normal users     
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Login as ID: pauline  
Go to the Capabilities list screen 
Try to modify access for the capabilities granted to 
Jack 
Access need to be revoked, then, delegate a new 
capability with new obligations 
• Is it useful to manage and 
modify access? 
• Is this function simple and 
easy? 
• Any improvement points? Yes Yes 
Lightweight – suitable for IoT devices       
f) Requirement 6 : Access control solution should be lightweight as IoT devices 
have low processing power (with acceptable performance)     
The implementation part of the proposed 
framework is carried out by setting up Igor on a 
Raspberry Pi 3. The core of Igor are an XML 
database, a web server and Xpath 1.0.  
Is it performing well? 
 
Any improvement points? 
Yes. For the scenario given (use case), 
using a normal mobile phone can be 
supported by the current setup of Igor (on 
Raspberry Pi), which I think meets your 
project requirements.  
However, I do not believe it can cover all 
ranges of IoT. For practical 
implementation, there are many other 
“ranges” of IoT – e.g. higher range / very 
demanding IoT machines, e.g. Smart cars, 
oil rigs, refineries? 
Yes. But I would like to 
see how to implement 
this in large scale? 
Other design choices       
Design choice 1 - Separation of policy 
administration and checking from the XML 
database. A separate Python module is used 
(access.py) to function as the Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) and PAP (Policy Administration 
Point). This is to enable better code management 
and reduce errors when replicating capabilities and 
performing policy checks 
Do you think this design is 
useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
Yes, good design. The XML database is 
readable, easy to understand and for 
support/troubleshooting. At the same time, 
the “capabilities” are hidden. 
Yes, I think this is 
usually the design I've 
seen 
Design choice 2 - There are several approaches to 
perform delegation. Gong’s approach is for the 
initiator to create a delegation message and pass it 
to the person who need the capability. He/she will 
then request access from the access server by 
presenting the message from the owner and the 
access server will then generate new capability and 
assign it to the requestor. We did not go with that 
approach as it presents too many steps and is 
cumbersome for the users. Instead, the capability 
owner can login to Igor using his/her credentials 
and delegate the capability through a user interface 
and the receiver of the capability will be notified 
through email that he/she has been granted access 
to certain objects. We have also given the choice 
to the token owner to specify if the newly 
delegated token can be further delegated by the 
new owner or not. 
Do you think this design is 
useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
I cannot comment much which approach is 
better as it is not clear to me how effective 
the steps of key exchange and trusts are 
being established (in actual application), 
user interface, method of the transfer of 
keys and if the mechanism is flawless 
cannot be assessed now.  
 
I do understand currently, a lot of “copy 
and paste” exercise in the secret key 
exchange, which is acceptable now, as 
authentication and security threats analysis 
is not in scope for this project.  Yes, its good 
Design choice 3 - We have also made the choice to 
enforce that all external tokens have limited 
lifespan (1 year) and a renewal process is forced 
upon the token holder after the expiry date.  
Do you think this design is 
useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
It is useful design as long as you have only 
one Igor, and revocation list not be shared 
with multiple Igors.  
It is useful design as long 
as you have only one 
Igor, and revocation list 
not be shared with 
multiple Igors.  
Design choice 4 - Each agent (device, people, 
plug-ins, other Igors) have their own profiles or 
listing in the XML database where the assigned 
capabilities and other credentials (e.g. logon ID, 
passwords, secret keys, etc.) are stored for 
ownership tracking purpose 
Do you think this design is 
useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? Yes, great design Yes, great design 
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Design choice 5 - We have chosen to have two 
types of capabilities: internal and external. Internal 
capabilities are used to control access to data, 
actions and plugins within the Igor’s database. For 
better performance, internal capabilities do not to 
use any encryptions. 
Do you think this design is 
useful? Why? 
 
Any improvement points? 
If the project is about authorization, this is 
actually not really in scope of this project 
but I appreciate that this has been thought 
of. There is indeed if anyone hacks Igor 
and access to its database directly (standard 
services server), it will be compromised.  Yes 
Summary       
What is your overall feedback about the usefulness 
of the design of the fine-grained access control for 
Igor?   
Yes, very useful. A good start for many 
future work by other students. 
Yes, the demand for this 
kind of solution will be 
more as more IoT devices 
entering the market 
Other comments   
I think the PAPA model and the use case 
are great and it is clear on what you want to 
achieve.  
Well done, you have done a very detail 
software design and development, careful 
thoughts have been put into the design with 
different user scenarios being taken care of. 
Extra efforts have been put into the 
implementation which is not in project 
requirement, e.g. the https secure protocol, 
hiding of the capabilities from the web 
interface. 
For future work, more thoughts should be 
made on how multiple Igors interacting 
with each other: How to manage each Igor 
has different data structures but they need 
to share information, updating each other, 
and key generations can be very complex 
without compromising security and open to 
attacks. Example, when one Igor in the 
group got D-DOS attack, you will have 
problem if you have many capability 
issuers and many revocation lists – the task 
of updating each other will be jammed.  
Great work! Do share your paper and git 
hub after your project. I would like to ask 
my students to try out your codes and 
experiment in our lab and continue future 
work. 
I have reservation about 
the centralized design. 
What if Igor is down and 
not available, this means 
no one can access to all 
the IoT devices? Should 
look at more de-
centralized solution or 
how to ensure continuous 
availability of the service. 
I feel user friendly 
interface is important for 
this to be adopted by 
normal users.  
How would you rate whether the project meets the 
overall objectives in addressing ethical/privacy 
issues we are facing regarding information 
generated by IoT devices? 
Rating from 1 – 5 (where 1 is 
the lowest and 5 the highest) 5 4 
 
